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Electoral Intermediaries

dc.audienceResearcherseng
dc.audienceStudentseng
dc.audienceTeacherseng
dc.contributor.institucionUniversidad del Rosariospa
dc.coverage.ciudadBogotáspa
dc.creatorGallego, Jorgespa
dc.creatorLi, Christopherspa
dc.creatorWantchekon, Leonardspa
dc.date.accessioned2020-05-29T13:33:07Zspa
dc.date.available2020-05-29T13:33:07Zspa
dc.date.created2020-05-29spa
dc.description.abstractDemocratic elections increasingly involve political intermediaries (e.g. grassroots organizations or political brokers). We develop a model of electoral competition in which candidates must decide between brokers (patronage) and grassroots organizations. Our model shows that patronage is more likely when public offices are relatively more “valuable” for brokers. Moreover, setups that constrain candidates from funding grassroots campaigns and weaken ties between politicians and citizens make patronage more likely. We show that patronage negatively affects citizens’ welfare, as winning brokers turned civil servants undermine the quality of governments. Finally, our model explores the role of policy deliberation in curbing patronage politics.eng
dc.format.extent33 páginasspa
dc.format.mimetypePDFspa
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorio.redinvestigadores.org/handle/Riec/64spa
dc.language.isoengeng
dc.relation.ispartofDocumentos de Trabajospa
dc.relation.numberNo. 45spa
dc.relation.repechttps://ideas.repec.org/p/rie/riecdt/45.htmlspa
dc.rights.accessRightsOpen Accesseng
dc.rights.ccAtribucion-NoComercial-CompartirIgual CC BY-NC-SA 4.0spa
dc.rights.spaAcceso abiertospa
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/eng
dc.subject.jelD70 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: Generaleng
dc.subject.jelD72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavioreng
dc.subject.keywordPatronageeng
dc.subject.keywordIntermediarieseng
dc.subject.keywordClientelismeng
dc.subject.keywordElectionseng
dc.subject.lembCompetencia electoral -- Modelospa
dc.subject.lembCampañas políticas -- Financiaciónspa
dc.titleElectoral Intermediarieseng
dc.typeWorking papereng
dc.type.hasversionPublished Versioneng
dc.type.spaDocumentos de Trabajospa

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