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Provision of noxious facilities using a market-like mechanism: A simple implementation in the lab

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dc.audienceResearcherseng
dc.audienceStudentseng
dc.audienceTeacherseng
dc.contributor.institucionUniversidad del Rosariospa
dc.coverage.ciudadBogotáspa
dc.creatorAlberti, Federicaspa
dc.creatorMantilla, Césarspa
dc.date.accessioned2020-03-19T20:31:27Zspa
dc.date.available2020-03-19T20:31:27Zspa
dc.date.created2020-03-19spa
dc.description.abstractWe study the provision of a public project that globally behaves as a public good but locally behaves as a private bad. This scenario imposes two problems: (i) find a compensation that makes the project acceptable for the pre-determined host, and (ii) secure the budget to pay for the project and the required compensation. We use a market-like mechanism with two useful properties for this scenario: players can either contribute or request subsidies to fund the public project, and players have veto power over the desired project quantity. In our game, two players benefit from a waste incinerator, whereas the third group member, the host, is harmed if the facility is too large. We analyze the efficiency and the redistributive potential of this mechanism, with and without communication among group members. We find that the probability of positive provision did not differ with and without communication. However, average provided quantities with respect to the efficient quantity increased from 54% to 81% with communication. We also find that contributions fell below the Lindahl taxes, allowing the players who benefit from a larger facility to accrue most of the efficiency gains. The latter result is consistent with the infrequent evidence of veto threats as a bargaining strategyeng
dc.format.extent42 páginasspa
dc.format.mimetypePDFeng
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorio.redinvestigadores.org/handle/Riec/54spa
dc.language.isoengeng
dc.relation.ispartofDocumentos de Trabajospa
dc.relation.numberNo. 35spa
dc.relation.repechttps://ideas.repec.org/p/rie/riecdt/35.htmlspa
dc.rights.accessRightsOpen Accesseng
dc.rights.ccAtribucion-NoComercial-CompartirIgual CC BY-NC-SA 4.0spa
dc.rights.spaAcceso abiertospa
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/eng
dc.subject.jelC92 - Laboratory, Group Behavioreng
dc.subject.jelH4 - Publicly Provided Goodseng
dc.subject.jelQ58 - Environmental Economics: Government Policyeng
dc.subject.keywordLab experimenteng
dc.subject.keywordNIMBYeng
dc.subject.keywordLULUeng
dc.subject.keywordPublic goodseng
dc.subject.lembProyectos -- Estrategias de negociaciónspa
dc.subject.lembProyectos públicos -- Bienes públicosspa
dc.subject.lembEstrategias de negociación -- Potencial redistributivospa
dc.titleProvision of noxious facilities using a market-like mechanism: A simple implementation in the labeng
dc.typeWorking papereng
dc.type.hasversionPublished Versioneng
dc.type.spaDocumentos de Trabajospa

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