Signaling Specific Skills and the Labor Market of College Graduates
Authors
Busso, Matias
Montaño, Sebastián
Muñoz-Morales, Juan
Editor
Publication date
2023-09-13
Document language
eng
Publisher
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Abstract
We use census-like data and a regression discontinuity design to study the labor market impacts of a signal provided by a government-sponsored award given to top-performing students on a nationwide college exit exam in Colombia. Students who can signal their high level of specific skills earn seven to ten percent more than identical students lacking such a signal. The signal allows workers to find jobs in more productive firms and sectors that better use their skills. The positive returns persist for up to five years. The signal favors workers from less advantaged groups who enter the market with weaker signals.
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Códigos JEL
J20 - General, J24 - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity, J31 - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials, J44 - Professional Labor Markets; Occupational Licensing, O15 - Human Resources; Human Development; Income Distribution; Migration, D80 - General
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Keywords
Signaling, skills, wage returns, college reputation, Colombia