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Does free information provision crowd out costly information acquisition? It’s a matter of timing

dc.audienceResearcherseng
dc.audienceStudentseng
dc.audienceTeacherseng
dc.contributor.institucionUniversidad del Rosariospa
dc.coverage.ciudadBogotáspa
dc.creatorAycinena, Diegospa
dc.creatorElbittar, Alexanderspa
dc.creatorGomberg, Andreispa
dc.creatorRentschler, Lucasspa
dc.date.accessioned2020-10-09T13:44:24Zspa
dc.date.available2020-10-09T13:44:24Zspa
dc.date.created2020-10-09spa
dc.description.abstractConventional wisdom suggests that promising an agent free information would crowd out costly information acquisition. We theoretically demonstrate that this intuition only holds as a knife-edge case where priors are symmetric. For asymmetric priors, agents are predicted to increase their information acquisition when promised free information in the future. We test in the lab whether such crowding out occurs for both symmetric and asymmetric priors. We find theoretical support for the predictions: when priors are asymmetric, the promise of future “free” information induces subjects to acquire costly information which they would not be acquiring otherwise.eng
dc.format.extent33 páginasspa
dc.format.mimetypePDFspa
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorio.redinvestigadores.org/handle/Riec/87spa
dc.language.isoengeng
dc.relation.ispartofDocumentos de Trabajospa
dc.relation.numberNo. 67spa
dc.relation.repechttps://ideas.repec.org/p/rie/riecdt/67.htmlspa
dc.relation.urihttps://repository.urosario.edu.co/bitstream/handle/10336/28282/dt257R.pdf?sequence=4&isAllowed=yspa
dc.rights.accessRightsOpen Accesseng
dc.rights.ccAtribucion-NoComercial-CompartirIgual CC BY-NC-SA 4.0spa
dc.rights.spaAcceso abiertospa
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/eng
dc.subject.jelC91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavioreng
dc.subject.jelD80 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty: Generaleng
dc.subject.jelC44 - Operations Research; Statistical Decision Theoryeng
dc.subject.keywordInformation acquisitioneng
dc.subject.keywordRational ignoranceeng
dc.subject.keywordExperimentseng
dc.subject.lembEconomía del conocimientospa
dc.subject.lembEconomía de la informaciónspa
dc.titleDoes free information provision crowd out costly information acquisition? It’s a matter of timingeng
dc.typeWorking papereng
dc.type.hasversionPublished Versioneng
dc.type.spaDocumentos de Trabajospa

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