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dc.creatorFerraz, Eduardo
dc.creatorMantilla, César
dc.date.created2020-09-22
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorio.redinvestigadores.orgRiec/85
dc.description.abstractProviding a noxious facility poses two problems previously unexplored together: where to locate it and how large it should be. We propose a mechanism combining some market-like properties with a modified second-price auction. The mechanism selects a host, a facility size, a compensation for hosting the project, and determines how the compensation and building costs are split among the non-hosts. Regardless of the selected host, any equilibrium outcome of this mechanism is a Lindahl allocation. If each community bids truthfully for becoming the host-a strategy which no community has incentives to deviate-the selected Lindahl allocation is globally optimal.
dc.format.extent33 páginas
dc.format.mimetypePDF
dc.language.isoeng
dc.relation.ispartofDocumentos de Trabajo
dc.rights.accessRightsOpen Access
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/
dc.titleLindahl vs. Lindahl: Optimal siting and sizing of a noxious facility
dc.typeWorking paper
dc.subject.jelD61 - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
dc.subject.jelH40 - Publicly Provided Goods: General
dc.subject.jelR53 - Public Facility Location Analysis; Public Investment and Capital Stock
dc.audienceResearchers
dc.audienceStudents
dc.audienceTeachers
dc.subject.keywordNIMBY
dc.subject.keywordLULU
dc.subject.keywordLindahl outcomes
dc.subject.keywordPublic projects
dc.subject.keywordMechanism design
dc.subject.lemb<LEMB>
dc.type.spaDocumentos de Trabajo
dc.rights.spaAcceso abierto
dc.rights.ccAtribucion-NoComercial-CompartirIgual CC BY-NC-SA 4.0
dc.type.hasversionPublished Version
dc.coverage.ciudadBogotá
dc.contributor.institucionUniversidad del Rosario
dc.relation.repechttps://ideas.repec.org/p/rie/riecdt/65.html
dc.relation.numberNo. 65


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