2020-09-222020-09-222020-09-22https://repositorio.redinvestigadores.org/handle/Riec/85Providing a noxious facility poses two problems previously unexplored together: where to locate it and how large it should be. We propose a mechanism combining some market-like properties with a modified second-price auction. The mechanism selects a host, a facility size, a compensation for hosting the project, and determines how the compensation and building costs are split among the non-hosts. Regardless of the selected host, any equilibrium outcome of this mechanism is a Lindahl allocation. If each community bids truthfully for becoming the host-a strategy which no community has incentives to deviate-the selected Lindahl allocation is globally optimal.33 páginasPDFengOpen AccessWorking paperD61 - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit AnalysisH40 - Publicly Provided Goods: GeneralR53 - Public Facility Location Analysis; Public Investment and Capital StockNIMBYLULULindahl outcomesPublic projectsMechanism designCarga fiscalAcceso abiertoAtribucion-NoComercial-CompartirIgual CC BY-NC-SA 4.0